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Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist Ct.(Canarelli), 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 12 (Mar. 24, 2022)1
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: DISQUALIFYING JUDGES FOR VIWEING
PRIVILEGED EVIDENCE
SUMMARY
When an issue arises regarding a judge’s disqualification, the Courts look at whether the
information attained was extrajudicial or non-extrajudicial. Additionally, the Court will look at the
fears of bias being present or fear of bias reaching a higher level of antagonism and favoritism.
The Supreme Court of Nevada looked at the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A) and
Kirksey to determine that Judge Sturman having viewed certain documents that were later
categorized as privileged had not biased her.2 The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s
decision to disqualify her. Judge Cadish was joined by Judges Pickering and Herndon in dissenting
based on lack of textual language and the wrong standard used.
OPINION
The petitioner asked the Supreme Court to reinstate a judge to a District Court case who
was disqualified under impartiality reasoning for reviewing documents which were deemed
privileged after they were viewed. Using the standard set forth by Kirksey v. State—since the
sources at question were not extrajudicial—the Supreme Court of Nevada found the District Court
erred in disqualifying Judge Sturman.3
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Scott Canarelli was the beneficiary of the Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust.
His parents conveyed minority interest int heir business to Scott and made payments to Scott from
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the same trust. His parents and Edward Lubbers all served as trustees. When his parents resigned,
Lubbers became the sole trustee. Lubbers then tried to sell the parents’ business entities and Scott
filed a petition to have Lubbers provide inventory related to the sale. Lubbers died before Scott
could obtain the deposition.
The documents at question were Lubbers’ notes that were disclosed, but then deemed
privileged. The commissioner found the notes to be privilege under attorney-client relationship
and work product doctrine, but parts were discoverable. When Scott and the former trustees
objected, Judge Sturman held a hearing and reviewed Lubbers’ notes to determine their privilege.
Judge Sturman agreed with the commissioner and that Scott could retain the notes. After the
decision was rendered, the former trustees wanted Judge Sturman disqualified because of her
inability to be partial after having reviewed Lubbers’ notes, which were deemed privileged. The
Chief judge disqualified Judge Sturman who filed an answer where she claimed she received no
personal knowledge of the facts and there was no cause for disqualification. The Chief Judge
granted the disqualification motion pursuant to Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A).4
DISCUSSION
We exercise our discretion to entertain the writ petition
Mandamus is only available when there is no other quick or acceptable remedy. 5 The
Supreme Court decided to consider the petition because of judicial economy and a guidepost for
future maters stemming from disqualification.
Kirksey v. State governs where the alleged bias arises from the judge’s performance of her
judicial duties
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There is a presumption that judges are unbiased that even a judge’s decision to not recuse
themselves does not automatically lead to the decision being overturned.6 Scott said Judge Sturman
did not exhibit favoritism as is the standard under Kirksey.7 The Nevada Supreme Court first held
that the disqualification must be from an extrajudicial source.8 There needed to be proof that the
Judge formed an opinion rendering an impossible fair decision.9 The Supreme Court held that the
stricter NCJC Rule 2.11(A) would create situations where disqualification could occur in every
case because judges might need to review prejudicial evidence in determining their admissibility
and creating such stringent rules would create an unworkable standard.10 The Supreme Court held
that a high standard had to be met to warrant disqualification, as is the standard set in Kirksey.11
Because the source was not extrajudicial, NCJC Rule 2.11(A) did not apply. Judge Sturman was
not biased nor is any prejudice shown to justify disqualification.12
CONCLUSION
The record did not show any antagonism, favoritism, or bias. Thus, the District Court’s
decision was erroneous. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus to reinstate Judge
Sturman.
CADISH, J., with whom PICKERING and HERNDON, JJ. Agree, dissenting
Firstly, Judge Cadish disagreed with the majority because of their interpretation of the
extrajudicial versus non-extrajudicial distinction. She believes the majority had no textual standard
for their distinction. She believed that the impartiality of a judge can stem regardless of how he or

6

Millen v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. 122 Nev. 1245, 1254, 148 P.3d 694, 701 (Nev. 2006); Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev.
410, 439, 216 P.3d 213, 233 (Nev. 2009).
7
Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 1007, 923 P.2d at 1119.
8
Id.
9
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
10
NEVADA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A); City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Hecht, 113
Nev. 664, 649, 940 P.2d 134, 138 (Nev. 1997).
11
Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 1007, 923 P.2d at 1119.
12
NEVADA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A).

3

she received the information. The text of NCJC Rule 2.11 comment 1 does not differentiate the
sources of bias.13
Judge Cadish expressed that the test is about reasonably questionable impartiality.14 Judge
Cadish stated that the majority demands a higher standard of favoritism, rather than reasonable
questionable impartiality. Judge Cadish stated that even lower standards can create public district
in the judiciary.
Next, Judge Cadish stated that the majority misapplied Kirksey because the controlling
authority of Liteky was based on a different statute.15 Liteky was based on actual, not potential,
bias.16 Liteky did not focus on favoritism, but any fear of inappropriateness.17 Additionally, Judge
Cadish pointed that the objective standard that 2.11(A) has does not mean that every case will lead
to a judge’s disqualification as the majority fears. Rather, these regular jobs done by the judge do
not lead to fears of impartiality, which is the motivating factor of disqualification standards.
Finally, Judge Cadish agreed that Judge Sturman acted appropriately in reviewing the
documents on which the litigation was based. However, she dissented on the ground that there
could very well have been reasonable questions of impartiality, rendering the District Court’s
disqualified justified.
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